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We provide mathematicaly rigorous justification of using term probability in connection to the
so called non-signalling theories, known also as Popescu’s and Rohrlich’s box worlds. No only
do we prove correctness of these models (in the sense that they describe composite system of two
independent subsystems) but we obtain new properties of non-signalling boxes and expose new tools
for further investigation. Moreover, it allows strightforward generalization to more complicated
systems.
INTRODUCTION
The idea of so-called non-signalling theories, or box
worlds, that originates from the paper of Popescu and
Rohrlich [1], became a popular tool in certain areas re-
lated to quantum information theory, like proving se-
curity of ciphering protocols [2] or finding bounds on
communication complexity [3] (to name only a few refer-
ences out of many). By a box world one usually mean a
physical model [4] build from two “black boxes”, where
each box is characterized by a finite set of input values
(that correspond to selection of an “observable”) and,
for each input, finite set of output values. To fix nota-
tion, let us denote particular box world by (U ,V), where
U = {U1, . . . ,UN}, V = {V1, . . . ,VM} and Ui,Vj are sets
of outcomes for i-th input on left box and j-th input on
right box, respectively.
A state of a box world is described with the help of
the following thought experiment: we supply boxes with
a large stream of input values and write down obtained
outputs. Then we compute frequency P (αβ|ab) of get-
ting outputs α, β given the inputs a, b on the left and
right box respectively [4].
Obviously, P must be a non-negative function and∑
α∈Ua,β∈Vb
P (αβ|ab) = 1, a = 1, . . . , N, b = 1, . . .M.
Moreover, we want boxes to be in some sense indepen-
dent, thus we impose additional restrictions on P , namely
the non-signalling conditions∑
α′∈Ua
P (α′β|ab) =
∑
α′∈Uc
P (α′β|cb)
∑
β′∈Vb
P (αβ′|ab) =
∑
β′∈Vc
P (αβ′|ac) (1)
satisfied for any a, b, c, α, β. These express the intuitive
idea that the output of one of the boxes does not de-
pend on the input of the other. It also reflects Ein-
stein’s causality principle in the model, as boxes could
be placed in space-like separated regions of space-time.
It is assumed that any P that satisfies all these proper-
ties (non-negativity, normalization and non-signalling) is
an admissible state for a given box world. In the sequel
we will call such P a PR-state of the box world.
The problem with the above widely used formulation
lies in the fact, that P is interpreted as a probability of
getting output αβ given input ab. This interpretation is
based on the thought experiment we discussed previously.
We argue that applying frequentist definition of proba-
bility to thought experiments is unjustified. The num-
ber of “paradoxes” related to probability, like Bertrand’s
paradox, Loschmidt’s paradox or Monty Hall problem to
name only a few, shows that we should not rely solely on
intuition when we talk about probability. On the other,
hand without sound probabilistic interpretation of P the
meaning of non-signalling conditions is questionable and
so the whole idea of non-signalling theories.
Lacking of any physical realization of box worlds, we
are forced to justify probabilistic interpretation of P on
the basis of axiomatic approach to probability. Because
box worlds obey neither classical nor quantum probabil-
ity rules (cf. [5]) it is clear that we need framework that
generalizes standard Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability.
Out of the two widely used such frameworks: operator
algebra approach (that focused on the algebra of random
variables) and quantum logic approach (that focused on
a partialy ordered set of random events), only the latter
is capable of “super-quantum” generalization.
The paper is organized in the following way. We begin
with a very brief introduction to quantum logics (detailed
exposition can be found e.g. in [6]). Then we construct
the logic of an arbitrary box world (U ,V). We prove
that in the framework of quantum logic it indeed can de-
scribe system composed of two independent subsystems
and discuss some of its properties. We end the paper
with some remarks about generalization of box worlds to
larger number of boxes.
Finally we would like to mention that there is another
mathematically rigorous attempt to formalize box world
theories called General Probability Theory or Generic
Probability Theory (GPT in short, see [7] and references
2therein, although it seems that the idea appeared for the
first time in 1974 in the Mielnik’s paper [8]). The basic
notion in the GPT is an arbitrary convex set of states.
GPT is more general than the quantum logic framework
that we use in this paper. On the other hand, the latter,
due to its more restrictive nature, provides more tools to
study features of the box world theories. Thus, our work
can be considered as complementary to the convex set
framework.
QUANTUM LOGICS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR
GENERALIZED PROBABILITY
Quantum logic approach originates from the seminal
paper of Birkhoff and von Neumann [9]. A detailed physi-
cal introduction and justification of the whole programme
can be found in the book of Piron [10], where the Hilbert
space formulation of quantum mechanics is derived from
the set of purely logical axioms. For us, it is important to
note, that the notion of probability was always modeled
over some physical system [11]. In case of classical proba-
bility, the sample space can be treated as a classical phase
space (set of pure classical states, not neccessarily Hamil-
tonian system), random events correspond to subsets of
the phase space and probability measure is classical (in
general mixed) state. So, by analogy, quantum proba-
bility can be defined by specifing the set random events,
that correspond to orthogonal projectors on the Hilbert
space of the system and a density matrix that defines a
measure on the set of all projectors (we lack the notion of
sample space, but that is why the quantum probability
is quantum). These ideas motivate definitions presented
in this section.
Definition 1 A quantum logic is a partialy ordered set
L with a map ⊥ : L → L such that
L1 there exists the greatest (denoted by 1) and the
least (denoted by 0) element in L,
L2 map p 7→ p⊥ is order reversing, i.e. p ≤ q implies
that q⊥ ≤ p⊥,
L3 map p 7→ p⊥ is idempotent, i.e. (p⊥)⊥ = p,
L4 for a countable family {pi}, s.t. pi ≤ p⊥j for i 6= j,
the supremum
∨
{pi} exists,
L5 if p ≤ q then q = p ∨ (q ∧ p⊥) (orthomodular law),
where p∨q is the least upper bound and p∧q the greatest
lower bound of p and q.
Elements of a quantum logic L are interpreted as
propositions about a physical system (equivalence class of
experimental setups that result in one of two outcomes:
either true or false). The partial order relation p ≤ q
is interpreted as “q is more plausible than p” (e.g. when-
ever p is true, q is true as well). The greatest element
of L corresponds to trivial experimental questions, i.e.
the ones that always result in true. Contrary, the least
element corresponds to experimental questions that are
always false. Map p 7→ p⊥ encodes negation, i.e. when-
ever p is true, p⊥ is false, etc. Then L2 and L3 sim-
ply encode the basic properties of negation. Whenever
p ≤ q⊥ we say that p and q are disjoint and denote it by
p ⊥ q. It is clear, that it means that p and q are mutu-
ally exclusive and consequently it should be meaningful
to ask question “p or q”. L4 extends this intuition to
any countable family of disjoint elements. The last one,
L5, lacks direct interpretation. One can think of it as
a very form of weak distributivity. Nevertheless, it has
profound technical importance.
If for any p, q ∈ L, p ∨ q, p ∧ q exist, then L is said to
be an orthomodular lattice. On the other hand, the set
of projectors on the Hilbert space, ordered by subspace
inclusion and with P⊥ = I−P is always an orthomodular
lattice. Thus we can define quantum probability as a
orthomodular lattice. Moreover, if the distributivity law
p ∨ (q ∧ r) = (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r) holds, then L is a Boolean
algebra, i.e. one can find a set Ω such that L can be
identified with a σ-algebra of its subsets.
Finally, let us point that it follows directly from L1
and L2 that both of de Morgan laws are satisfied, i.e. if
p ∨ q exists then p⊥ ∧ q⊥ exists and is equal to (p ∨ q)⊥,
similarly if p ∧ q exists then p⊥ ∨ q⊥ exists and is equal
to (p ∧ q)⊥.
Definition 2 An element p 6= 0 of a quantum logic L is
called an atom whenever 0 ≤ q ≤ p implies that q = 0 or
q = p. L is called atomic whenever for any q ∈ L there
exists an atom p ≤ q. It is called atomistic, whenever
any element q ∈ L is a supremum of atoms less than q.
Definition 3 A subset K ⊂ L of quantum logic L is a
sublogic, whenever (i) if p ∈ K then p⊥ ∈ K (ii) for any
countable family {pi} ⊂ K of mutually disjoint elements∨
{pi} ∈ K.
Definition 4 Let L be a quantum logic. A state ρ on L
is a map ρ : L → [0, 1], s.t.
S1 ρ(1) = 1,
S2 for a countable family {pi}, s.t. pi ≤ p⊥j ρ(
∨
{pi}) =∑
i pi.
Set of all states for quantum logic L will be denoted by
S(L).
Value ρ(p), p ∈ L can be interpreted as probability of
getting answer true for p. It is straightforward to check
that this agrees with the interpretation of elements of L.
In particular, it can be easily shown, that if p ≤ q then
3ρ(p) ≤ ρ(q), ∀ρ. In physical applications, we usually as-
sume that we have enough states to determine the order,
i.e. if ρ(p) ≤ ρ(q), ∀ρ then p ≤ q.
From the physical point of view we are often inter-
ested in subsets of observables which outcomes can be de-
scribed by classical probability models (e.g. complete set
of commuting observables in quantum physics, or in other
words, simultenously measureable observables). For this
purpose we define:
Definition 5 Let L be a quantum logic. Then p, q ∈ L
are compatible, what we denote by p↔ q, whenever there
exist pairwise disjoint questions p1, q1, r such that p =
p1 ∨ r, q = q1 ∨ r.
More generaly, a subset A ⊂ L is said to be compatible
whenever for any finite subset {p1, . . . , pn} ⊂ A there
exist finite subset G ⊂ L, such that (i) elements of G
are mutually disjoint, (ii) any pi is supremeum of some
subset of G.
This definition looks very technical. It is easier to think
of compatibility in terms of the following property:
Theorem 6 ([12], Thm. 1.3.23) Let A ⊂ L be a com-
patible subset of quantum logic. Then there exists a
Boolean sublogic K ⊂ L, s.t. A ⊂ K.
Observe, that in general pairwise compatiblity in A ⊂
L is not sufficient for existence of a Boolean sublogic
containing A (cf. [12] for examples)
Although elements of L can be abstract, we will be
interested in one particular class of quantum logics,
namely:
Definition 7 (see [12], Sec. 1.1) A concrete logic ∆
is a family of subsets of some set Ω with partial order
relation given by set inclusion and A⊥ = Ω\A satisfying:
C1 ∅ ∈ ∆,
C2 A ∈ ∆ implies Ω \A ∈ ∆,
C3 for any countable family {Ai} ⊂ ∆ of mutually
disjoint sets
⋃
{Ai} ∈ ∆.
Example 8 Let Ω = {1, . . . , 2k} and ∆ be a family of
subsets Ω with even number of elements. Then ∆ is a
concrete logic, which is a Boolean algebra for k = 1, an
orthomodular lattice for k = 2 and a quantum logic for
k = 3. 
Although concrete logics are obviously more general
than Boolean algebras and even orthomodular lattices,
they exhibit some classical properties. For example,
Heisenberg uncertainty relations are not satisfied in con-
crete logics [6], precisely
Definition 9 An observable X on a quantum logic L is a
map X : B(R)→ L, where B(R) is a set of Borel subsets
of real line, such that:
O1 X(R) = 1,
O2 X(R \A) = X(A)⊥,
O3 X(A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An) = X(A1) ∨ · · · ∨ X(An) for any
family of mutually disjoint Ai’s.
For an observable X we can define its expected value
and variance by
µ(X) :=
∫
R
tµ(X(dt)),
∆µX :=
∫
R
(t− µ(X))2µ(X(dt)),
whenever integrals exist. Then for any pair of observables
X,Y with finite expected value and variance one of two
conditions is satisfied, either
∀ε > 0 ∃ a state µ with finite variance for X and Y,
(∆µX)(∆µY ) < ε (2)
or
∃ε > 0 ∀ states µ with finite variance for X and Y,
(∆µX)(∆µY ) ≥ ε. (3)
In the former case we say that Heisenberg uncertainty
relations are not satisfied, while in the latter case we say
that Heisenberg uncertainty relations are satisfied. Then
it follows that if L is a concrete logic then the Heisenberg
uncertainty relations are not satisfied (see Thm. 50 and
Thm. 129 in [6]).
CONCRETE LOGIC OF NON-SIGNALLING
THEORIES
Let us fix our attention on arbitrary box world (U ,V),
with N,M be the number of distinct input values on left
box and right box respectively. We define sets
Γ1 = {(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) | xi ∈ Ui},
Γ2 = {(y1, y2, . . . , yM ) | yi ∈ Vi},
Γ = Γ1 × Γ2
If boxes obeyed classical physics, then Γ1,Γ2,Γ would
correspond to the phase spaces of left box, right box and
the phase space of a composite system.
With any experimental question of the form:
“does intput a on left box and b on right
result in output α on left box and β on right?”
(4)
we assign an element [aα, bβ] ⊂ Γ in the following way:
[aα, bβ] = {(x, y) ∈ Γ | xa = α, yb = β} (5)
We denote by A the set of all such subsets of Γ. Let
L be a sublogic of Boolean algebra 2Γ generated by A
(the smallest sublogic containing A; it exists, see [12]).
It follows that:
4Observation 10 L is a concrete logic with finite number
of elements. Moreover, any element of L is either a finite
union of mutually disjoint sets from A or is an empty set.
Let us observe that [aα, bβ] ⊥ [cγ, dδ] whenever
[aα, bβ] ∩ [cγ, dδ] = ∅, i.e. when (i) a = c and α 6= γ
or (ii) b = d and β 6= δ. We will write p ⊕ q to indicate
p ∨ q with implicit assumption that p ⊥ q.
Lemma 11 If p = [aα, bβ] ≤ q, then either (i) q = p⊕q′,
(ii) q = [aα,1] ⊕ q′, (iii) q = [1, bβ] ⊕ q′ or (iv) q = 1,
where
[aα,1] = {(x, y) ∈ Γ | xa = α},
[1, bβ] = {(x, y) ∈ Γ | yb = β}.
Proof Let q = q1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ qn with qi = [aiαi, biβi] ∈ A.
Alternative (i) is obvious, so let us assume that none of
qi’s equals p. Let first k of qi’s be not disjoint with p,
i.e. p⊥/ qi for i = 1, . . . , k and p ⊥ qi for i = k + 1, . . . , n.
Thus any of qi’s for i = 1, . . . , k must be of the form: (I)
qi = [aiαi, bβ], (II) qi = [aα, biβi] or (III) qi = [aiαi, biβi],
where ai 6= a, bi 6= b.
Let us firstly examine the case when one of qi’s, say
q1, is of the form (I). By mutual disjointness of qi’s all
remaining i = 2, . . . , k are either of form (I) or (III).
Let α′ ∈ Ua1 , α
′ 6= α1 be another output for input a1.
Then (x, y) ∈ p, where xa = α, xa1 = α
′, yb = β and
rest arbitrary, but (x, y) /∈ q1. Consequently, there must
be another qi, say q2, such that (x, y) ∈ q2. By previous
comment, either (a) q2 = [a1α
′, bβ] (form (I) disjoint with
q1) or (b) q2 = [a1α
′, b2β2] (form (III) disjoint with q1).
Assume that (b) is the case. Take another (x′, y′) ∈ p
equal to (x, y) except for yb2 = β
′ 6= β2. Then (x′, y′) /∈
q1 since xa1 6= α1 and (x
′, y′) /∈ q2 since yb2 6= β2. Again,
one of qi’s must be of the form qi = [a1α
′, b2β
′] (form
(III) disjoint with q1 and q2). Observe that there is no
admissible form (I) disjoint with q1 and q2 for that case.
If we repeat this reasoning for all outputs Vb2 we con-
clude that there is some set I of i = 1, . . . , k such that⊕
i∈I qi = [a1α
′,1]. But [a1α
′,1] = [a1α
′, bβ]⊕ r, where
r ⊥ p, thus case (b) reduces to (a).
Consequently, we can assume without loss of generality
(a) is always the case. We repeat reasoning for all outputs
in Ua1 and conclude that there must be some set J of
i = 1, . . . , k such that
⊕
i∈J qi = [1, bβ]. The case when
one of qi’s is of the form II is symmetric.
Finally, let q1 = [a1α1, b1β1]. Take (x, y) ∈ p such that
xa = α, xa1 = α
′, yb = β, yb1 = β1 and rest arbitrary.
Clearly (x, y) /∈ q1. Let (x, y) ∈ q2. Since all of qi’s
must be of the form III, q2 ⊥ q1 result in either (a) q2 =
[a1α
′, b2β2], b2 6= b1 or (b) q2 = [a1α′, b1β1].
Assume (a). Take another (x′, y′) ∈ p equal to (x, y)
except for y′b2 = β
′. Then there must be qi, such that
(x′, y′) ∈ qi and qi ⊥ q1 and qi ⊥ q2 require that
qi = [a1α
′, b2β
′]. Like previously, we repeat this for all
possible outcomes of b2 and conclude that there must be
subset I of i = 1, . . . , k such that
⊕
i∈I qi = [a1α1,1] =
[a1α1, bβ]⊕ r, so we can rewrite q in the way that there
is qi of the form (I).
On the other hand, if (b) is the case, we repeat rea-
soning for all other outputs of a1 and then symmetrically
for all outputs of b1 and conclude that q = 1. 
Theorem 12 Let P be a PR-box state on (U ,V)-box
world and let L be an above defined logic. Then ρP : L →
[0, 1] defined by
(i) ρP (∅) = 0,
(ii) ρP ([aα, bβ]) = P (αβ|ab),
(iii) ρP (
∨
i pi) =
∑
i ρP (pi), for any set {pi} ⊂ A of
pairwise disjoint elements
is a state on L. On the other hand, any state ρ on L de-
fines a PR-state Pρ on (U ,V)-box world by: Pρ(αβ|ab) =
ρ([aα, bβ]).
Proof We need to show that the definition of ρP is
correct, i.e. for all p ∈ L, and for all decompositions
p = p1⊕· · ·⊕pn (iii) results in the same value. Then the
fact that ρ is a state follows directly from its definition.
The simplest case p = 1 follows from normalization
of PR-box state. If p = [aα,1] or p = [1, bβ] for
some a, α, b, β then decomposition is not unique, but non-
signalling condition guarantess that (iii) does not intro-
duce any ambiguity. It follows from lemma 11 that p has
non-unique decomposition into atoms only if [aα,1] ≤ p
or [1, bβ] ≤ p for some a, α, b, β Consequently, any p can
be decomposed into: p = p1 ⊕ . . .⊕ pk where pi has one
of three forms: (A) pi = [aiαi, biβi], (B) pi = [aiαi,1] or
(C) pi = [1, biβi].
Consequently, it remains to show that (iii) is valid in
case of [aα,1]⊕ p = [1, bβ]⊕ q. Let q = q1 ⊕ . . .⊕ qk be
decomposition into atoms. Observe that for all (x, y) ∈ p,
with yb = β
′ 6= β (x, y) /∈ [1, bβ], so for any β′ ∈ Vb \ β
there is (possible more than one) qi = [ciγi, bβ
′].
Let q1 = [cγ, bβ1] and assume that c1 6= a. Take
(x, y) ∈ [aα,1], such that xa = α, xc = γ′ 6= γ, yb = β1.
Then (x, y) /∈ [1, bβ] and (x, y) /∈ q1. There must be
qi = [ciγi, bβi] such that (x, y) ∈ qi, but qi ⊥ q1 requires
that ci = c, γi = γ
′. Repeating this reasoning we con-
clude that there must be subset I of i = 1, . . . , k such that⊕
i∈I qi = [1, bβ1]. On the other hand, if c1 = a, then
we immediately get that q1 = [aα, bβ1]. Consequently,
q can be written in the form q =
⊕
β′∈V1
b
[aα, bβ′] ⊕⊕
β′∈V2
b
[1, bβ′] where V1b ∪V
2
b = Vb \β. The same can be
done for p. Now it is easy to observe that by expanding
terms [aαi,1] and [1, bβi] we can obtain the same atomic
decomposition on the left and right. By transitivity of
equality relation, we conclude that (iii) is well defined.
5The second part of theorem follows immediately from
the fact, that non-signaling condition actually means that
there are elements of the type [aα,1], [1, bβ]:∑
β∈Vb
ρ([aα, bβ]) = ρ([aα,1]) =
∑
γ∈Vc
ρ([aα, cγ]), etc. 
Now we are going to argue that L is the logic of (U ,V)-
box world. Firstly, let us observe that the set of states on
L is order determining. One the other hand, in the op-
erational construction of the logic of the physical system
one assumes that the set of physical states determines
the order. Consequently, states of the logic of (U ,V)-box
world induced by the PR-states should be order deter-
mining. Secondly, elements of A clearly correspond to
atoms of the (U ,V)-box world logic. Moreover, definition
of the (U ,V)-box world explicitly enumerates all possi-
ble the most elementary experiment that we can perform
on the box world. This somehow forces us to assume,
that the logic of (U ,V)-box world is not only atomic, but
also atomistic. Summarizing, the logic L is the minimal
completion of the set A that has sufficiently many states
(all PR-box states are represented) and is consistent with
definition of box world (all states are non-signaling).
Although the definition of L as a certain concrete logic
modeled on a classical system seems to be a lucky guess,
it emerged from the study of properties the abstractly
constructed logic of exemplary box world system with
binary input and binary output for both boxes [13].
Elements [aα,1], [1, bβ] (and their valid ⊕-sums) can
be interpreted as propositions about only one of boxes,
thus we call them localized in A or localized in B respec-
tively. Observe, that [aα,1] ⊥ [a′α′,1] if and only if
a = a′ and α 6= α′. We will use following notation:
[a ∈ P ,1] = ⊕{[aα,1] | α ∈ P}, where P ⊂ Ua.
Proposition 13 Any pair of elements p, q ∈ L such that
p is localized in A and q is localized in B is compatible.
Proof Let p = [a ∈ P ,1], q = [1, b ∈ Q]. Let us define
p1 =
⊕
α∈P,β∈Vb\Q
[aα, bβ], q1 =
⊕
α∈Ua\P,β∈Q
[aα, bβ],
r =
⊕
α∈P,β∈Q[aα, bβ]. It is clear that p1, q1, r are mu-
tually disjoint and p = p1 ⊕ r, q = q1 ⊕ r. 
Lemma 14 Let p = [a ∈ P ,1], q = [a′ ∈ Q,1]. Then:
p ∧ q =
{
0 if a 6= a′,
[a ∈ P ∩Q,1] otherwise,
p ∨ q =
{
1 if a 6= a′,
[a ∈ P ∪Q,1] otherwise.
Proof Firstly, let us assume that a 6= a′. Then p∧q must
be a subset of
p ∩ q = {(x, y) | xa ∈ P , xa′ ∈ Q}
but this set has constraints on two elements of x, so there
is no non empty r ∈ L, such that r ⊂ p∩q. Consequently,
p ∧ q = 0. Then p ∨ q = 1 follows from the de Morgan
law. When a = a′ the proof is obvious (p∩ q = p∧ q and
p ∪ q = p ∨ q). 
Proposition 15 Elements p = [a ∈ P ,1], q = [a′ ∈
Q,1] are compatible if and only if a = a′.
Proof We will show the non-trivial implication by contra-
position. Assume that a 6= a′. Since p⊥ = [a ∈ Ua \ P ,1]
p ∨ (p⊥ ∧ q) = p ∨ 0 = p,
and
(p ∨ p⊥) ∧ (p ∨ q) = 1 ∧ 1 = 1,
so p, p⊥, q cannot be contained in Boolean sublogic of L.
Theorem 16 A set of pairwise compatible localized ele-
ments [a ∈ P1,1], . . . , [a ∈ Pk,1], [1, b ∈ Q1], . . . , [1, b ∈
Ql] is compatible.
Proof Denote P =
⋃k
i=1 Pi and Q =
⋃l
j=1Qj .
Clearly there is a mutually disjoint partition {P˜s}
K
s=1
of P , such that any Pi =
⋃
s∈Ii
P˜s for some Ii ⊂
{1 . . .K}. Similarly, there is a mutually disjoint parti-
tion {Q˜s}Ls=1 of Q such that any Qj =
⋃
s∈Jj
Q˜s for
some Jj ⊂ {1 . . . L}. Let us define:
pi =
⊕
{[aα, bβ] | α ∈ P˜i˜, β ∈ Vb \ Q},
qj =
⊕
{[aα, bβ] | α ∈ Ua \ P , β ∈ Q˜j˜},
rij =
⊕
{[aα, bβ] | α ∈ P˜i˜, β ∈ Q˜j˜}.
Clearly pi, qj , rij are mutually disjoint. Moreover
[a ∈ Pi,1] =
⊕
s∈Ii

ps ⊕ l⊕
j=1
⊕
t∈Jj
rst

 ,
[1, b ∈ Qj] =
⊕
t∈Jj
(
qt ⊕
k⊕
i=1
⊕
s∈Ii
rst
)
. 
The last Theorem is crucial for the interpretation of
(U ,V)-box world system as a system composed of two
separate subsystems. As was noted in the proof of
Thm. 12 non-signaling condition is statement of merely
existence of certain elements of the logic. It is far from
obvious that this implies any form of compatibility in
general (although we do not rule out such possibility). It
is worth to mention here, that Coecke points out that in
the context of process theory the non-signaling condition
is also not the most adequate notion [14].
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FIG. 1. The 0,1-pasting of Boolean algebras Ba = 2
Ua , i.e.
disjoint sum of all Boolean blocks Ba, with minimal and max-
imal elements identified.
Corollary 17 The logic of a single box in an (U ,V)-box
world is a 0,1-pasting of Boolean logics Ba = 2Ua , i.e.
the logic L1 of left box is a disjoint union of {Ba}
N
a=1
modulo by equivalence relation that identify 0’s and 1’s
of all Ba’s (cf. Figure 1). Consequently, the logic of
single box is an orthomodular lattice.
Proof It is clear that Ba = {[a ∈ P ,1] | P ⊂ Ua} is a
sublogic of L, which is a Boolean logic. Then the claim
follows directly from the Lemma 14. 
We would like to emphasize that this shows that the
logic of single boxes in box-world models is naively sim-
ple. It consists of the Boolean logics glued together in the
most “free” way. There are no relations imposed between
observables defined by different inputs.
CONCLUSIONS
We constructed propositional system for a box world
model consisting of two boxes with any finite number of
inputs and outputs. Obtained structure justifies proba-
bilistic interpretation of box world models in the sense of
quantum logics. Our construction extends in an obvious
way to many box models, although their properties were
not yet studied by us.
Quantum logic approach allows for a more refined ex-
amination of the model that the convex set approach (in
the sense of [7]). In particular, we were able to discuss
notion of compatibility, Heisenberg uncertainty relations
and we identified single box logics.
Our results allow to conclude that, contrary to the
common belief (cf. [15],[4]) box world theories cannot be
considered as a more general than quantum theory, even
if one restricts to unphysical finite dimensional Hilbert
spaces. The reason is three-fold:
1. logic of box-world model has always finite number
of elements, while the logic of even the simplest
quantum model (two level system) has an infinite
number of elements,
2. logic of single boxes, being a 0,1-pasting of Boolean
algebras, is structurally much simpler that the
propositional systems of quantum mechanics,
3. the logic of box-world model is set-representable
and consequently such models do not satisfy
Heisenberg uncertainty relations.
Although such models permit stronger correlations than
possible in quantum mechanics, we emphasize that this
is only one of many aspects of probability theory.
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